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INTRODUCTION
In this Briefing Paper we examine an array of post-
Brexit food safety legislation, covering pesticides, 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), food 
additives and microbiological food safety. The UK 
Government has committed itself to incorporating 
EU law unchanged as the starting point for 
the post-Brexit regulatory regime. However, EU 
institutions underpin UK food safety legislation to 
the extent that detaching UK law and policy making 
unavoidably constitutes major legislative reform. 
More concerningly, our analysis suggests that the 
UK’s post-Brexit food safety rules fall short of the 
level of protection currently provided by the EU: in 
some cases, they give ministers broad discretion to 
make future changes without equivalent scrutiny.
KEY POINTS
• The Government’s approach, as set out in the EU Withdrawal Act (2018), is to transfer EU law into UK 
law and address any ‘deficiencies’ in that law (such as references to EU institutions) by secondary 
legislation. 
• This has resulted in a large body of new food safety legislation that replaces EU legislative 
processes and institutions with those of the UK. 
• Detaching UK food safety regulation from EU bodies, while maintaining agricultural and food systems 
that are no less harmful to the environment and public health, is a challenging task. This is because 
the UK must develop capacities, competencies and procedures that have not been required or 
available domestically for many years.
• It is thus implausible to suggest, as the Government argues, that new UK food safety laws constitute 
minor technical changes and avoid ‘new legal frameworks’.
• Further, this new legislation gives ministers powers to change retained EU law without any primary 
legislation in the future. Only primary legislation provides Parliament with adequate time and 
opportunity to scrutinise and amend proposals; it also allows for wider consultation and public 
participation.
• There is tension between the regulatory divergence that these Statutory Instruments (SIs) permit and 
the imperative to maintain open borders within the UK. Empowering devolved nations to change food 
safety legislation could complicate trade in agricultural and food products within the UK.
• Devolved food safety standards could also undermine the UK’s ability to take a unified approach to 
external trade negotiations.
• Powers for ministers to change retained EU law further weaken Parliament’s already tenuous ability 
to oversee external trade agreements. 
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correct what are characterised as ‘deficiencies’ 
in this ‘retained EU law’, for example where a 
provision no longer has any practical application by 
referring to an EU institution.5 In the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Act, the Government claimed 
this approach was the “only appropriate solution in 
the circumstances”6 and committed to introducing 
primary legislation to “make major changes 
to policy or establish new legal frameworks.”7 
The distinction between primary and secondary 
legislation is important. Primary legislation is 
made through the democratic processes in the 
UK Parliament for UK law and in the EU for EU 
law. Secondary or delegated legislation is made 
by ministers (or other bodies) under powers given 
to them by primary legislation. This distinction is 
blurred by the Government’s approach to converting 
EU law into UK law.
Both before and after the passing of the Withdrawal 
Act, there was much concern about this approach 
to amending EU law.8 During the passage of the 
Bill, the House of Lords Constitutional Committee 
characterised the Withdrawal Act as a ‘tapestry 
of delegated powers that are breath-taking in 
terms of both their scope and potency’.9 Recently, 
Professor Craig has described this approach as 
giving “very considerable power to the executive 
in making regulations and limit[ing] legislative 
oversight.”10 Thus a key question is whether the 
5  Ibid para 123-135. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) 
Bill would amend the Withdrawal Act so that the cut-off point is the 
end of the ‘implementation period’, not ‘exit day’, and the powers to 
correct ‘deficiencies’ extend until two years after the implementation 
period.
6  Ibid para 13
7  Ibid para 14
8  A parliamentary ‘sifting’ procedure for Brexit SIs was created: 
sifting committees must assess whether proposed negative SIs 
should be upgraded to the affirmative procedure. Affirmative statutory 
instruments must be debated in both Houses of Parliament. Unlike 
primary legislation they cannot be modified – only approved or 
rejected. Negative statutory instruments do not need to be debated 
nor actively approved by Parliament. For example, Hansard Society, 
Taking back control for Brexit and beyond: delegated legislation, 
parliamentary scrutiny and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
(September 2017); Select Committee on the Constitution, European 
Union (Withdrawal Bill) (House of Lords, January 2018); House of 
Lords Library Briefing, Brexit and delegated legislation (March 2019); 
J Tomlison, A Sinclair, ‘Eliminating effective scrutiny’ Parts 1, 2 and 3 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/04/alexandra-sinclair-and-
joe-tomlinson-eliminating-effective-scrutiny-prorogation-no-deal-brexit-
and-statutory-instruments/
9  House of Lords Constitution Committee Interim Report, https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldconst/19/19.
pdf. See also this helpful explainer: https://publiclawforeveryone.
com/2017/09/07/house-of-lords-constitution-committee-issues-
interim-report-on-eu-withdrawal-bill/
10  P Craig, ‘Constitutional principle, the rule of law and political 
reality: the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (2019) 82(2) The 
Modern Law Review 319, 345
This also has implications for future patterns of 
trade in agricultural and food products. Within 
the UK, there is tension between the regulatory 
divergence that these Statutory Instruments (SIs) 
permit and the imperative to maintain open borders 
within the UK. Prime Minister Johnson indicated 
that he is keen for the UK standards to diverge 
from those of the EU,1 but Scotland wishes to 
maintain alignment with EU regulation.2 Under the 
new Withdrawal Agreement, if passed, Northern 
Ireland would continue to be bound by EU law in 
the areas we review and the SIs would have to be 
amended.3 But divergence could undermine both 
the UK’s ability to undertake a unified approach 
to external trade agreements and also the 
maintenance of the UK’s internal free movement of 
goods. With respect to external trade agreements, 
such as with the United States, extensive scope 
for ministers to change food safety legislation 
would provide a relatively clear path for a UK Prime 
Minister to overcome parliamentary opposition to 
any new trade agreements that cover agricultural 
and food products.
Thus further safeguards are needed in order to 
ensure that changes to food safety legislation 
benefit from adequte scrutiny, and are undertaken 
with a unified approach among at least Scotland, 
England and Wales as separate arrangements 
may apply for Northern Ireland. This means that 
devolved nations must have stronger oversight 
over UK external trade negotiations. Further, if 
the ratification of a post-Brexit trade agreement 
requires changes to the levels of statutory 
protection in the areas of food safety, the 
environment and animal welfare, Parliament should 
adopt legislation stipulating that such changes 
must be made through primary legislation.
PREPARING UK FOOD SAFETY 
LEGISLATION FOR BREXIT
The EU Withdrawal Act 2018 aims to create a 
“functioning statute book”4 on Brexit day by 
transferring EU law, as it stands immediately before 
exit day, into UK law. Extensive powers are given 
to UK ministers to make secondary legislation 
– in the form of statutory instruments (SIs) – to 
1  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/23/johnson-
hints-at-major-reforms-to-tax-and-industry-post-brexit
2  https://news.gov.scot/news/continuity-bill-update
3  Revised Withdrawal Agreement, 17.10.19 Article 5(4), Annex 2
4  European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 Explanatory Memorandum 
para 10
3vegetables.
The delegated powers in the SIs include provision 
for the transfer of the functions of EU authorities 
to UK public authorities. But it is implausible to 
suggest that new UK environmental, food safety 
and animal welfare laws functioning without the 
involvement of the EU and its institutions, do not 
constitute ‘new legal frameworks’. Nor can it be 
assumed that transference automatically provides 
the same level of consumer and environmental 
protection. It is necessary to establish whether 
UK public authorities have equivalent powers and 
duties to those of the EU, or whether they are 
enhanced or diminished. Legislative processes 
are connected to policy aims, they are not mere 
technicalities. Legislation influences how the goals 
of policy are specified, interpreted and pursued. It 
can also influence the use of scientific evidence 
and expertise, the possible relevance of public 
participation and requirements for reporting and 
monitoring. 
WILL THE UK AGRICULTURAL AND 
FOOD SAFETY AND STANDARDS 
LEGISLATION BE FUNCTIONALLY 
EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE EU?
Here we analyse core food safety SIs vis-à-vis 
the original EU legislation. We examine primarily 
four issues, summarised in a table at the end 
of the section. First, does the SI itself introduce 
substantive policy changes. Second, does it enable 
the introduction of further SIs to undertake future 
policy changes (which the Government has stated 
that it will do only through primary legislation). 
Third, does it weaken the requirement to obtain 
independent scientific advice when approving new 
products or substances. Finally, does it weaken 
monitoring mechanisms. 
It is important to note that the SIs may not capture 
the regulatory processes that the UK Government 
envisages, including the role of UK agencies. 
However, we proceed on the basis that, if such 
arrangements are not set out in UK legislation, 
this makes them less transparent, and more 
discretionary, than the parent EU legislation. In 
general, EU provision for ‘effective enforcement’ is 
deleted from the SIs we have reviewed. Legislation 
for enforcement of the specific regimes is found 
elsewhere in UK law and is devolved. There is 
provision in the SIs for a UK regime, but it is only 
with consent of the devolved countries, which has 
not been forthcoming. The UK Government re-
current Government is using its power merely 
to ensure continuity with EU law and policy or 
whether it is using SIs to change these key policy 
areas and legal frameworks. As we outline in 
the subsequent sections, the SIs we examine 
confer considerable powers to ministers to amend 
inherited legal frameworks by statutory instrument 
and our analysis suggests that the Government 
has interpreted its delegated powers in a way that 
threatens to circumvent protections provided under 
the Withdrawal Act11 and enables major policy 
change through future SIs.
DEEP REGULATORY REFORM, NOT A 
TECHNICAL EXERCISE
The Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) has produced 25% of all SIs, or 
about 100 in total. This is far more than any other 
government department and is indicative of the 
fact that approximately 80 per cent of environment, 
food and agriculture law and policy is made at 
EU level with certain powers given to Member 
States.12 Detaching UK food safety regulation 
from EU bodies, while maintaining agricultural 
and food systems that are no less harmful to the 
environment and public health than those provided 
by the EU’s regime, is a challenging task, even if 
the SIs merely transfer all the provisions of the 
status quo. This is because the UK must develop 
capacities, competencies and procedures that 
have not been required or available domestically 
for many years.
The UK has ‘outsourced’ many regulatory functions 
to EU bodies with statutory roles divided between 
Member States, the European Commission, 
scientific agencies and standing committees 
for delegated legislation, in addition to EU 
processes for primary legislation and enforcement. 
Currently EU institutions have responsibility for 
assessing and authorising active substances in 
pesticide products, setting permitted pesticides’ 
residue levels in food, for approving new GMOs 
for consumption by people and livestock and 
for possible cultivation, and for approving food 
additives and disinfectant treatments for meat and 
11  The Withdrawal Act creates a novel legal category called ‘direct 
retained principal EU law’. The SIs examined in this Briefing Paper 
fall into that category. Primary legislation is required to modify this 
law (Withdrawal Act, Section 7(2)(c)), Section 8) 
12  D Mitchell, ‘EU Exit: a personal perspective from inside 
Government’, UKELA newsletter, https://symphony-live-new2.
s3.amazonaws.com/MiRhfVCTkJU2zHYUoVHFg1UHBEOAr19HLiPAp7
pgJtrIN5A2RgH2nSWpjXbynf4v/e-law%20114.pdf
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4advice.17 The EU’s provision for a penalty 
regime applicable to infringements of pesticide 
regulations, and a requirement that such a regime 
shall be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, 
has been omitted from the SIs.18 New powers are 
given to UK ministers allowing them to issue or 
amend guidance on approvals and assessments 
of pesticide products and maximum residue 
levels, including the coordination of compliance 
checks, by statutory instrument rather than primary 
legislation.19 
The UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
and its Chemical Regulatory Division, currently 
assesses pesticide products, but not their active 
ingredients. The Expert Committee on Pesticides 
advises the HSE and the Expert Committee on 
Pesticide Residues in Food monitors pesticide 
residues. Unlike the Commission, EFSA and the 
Standing Committee, whose roles and influence 
are formalised in EU legislation, the roles of the 
UK bodies are not specified in the Brexit SIs. 
GMO AUTHORISATIONS AND 
LABELLING
The EU has established a legal framework for the 
risk assessment and authorisation of GMOs, as 
well as their labelling to ensure consumer choice 
and traceability.20 In the Explanatory Memorandum 
to one of the Brexit SIs pertaining to GMOs, the 
Government states that these “simply change the 
identity of the bodies carrying out the specified 
legislative functions and convert EU procedures 
to UK procedures... and do not make substantive 
changes to policy content.”21 However this SI 
transfers powers to the DEFRA Secretary of State 
to introduce future SIs “to make legislation in 
England for the purpose of: i) developing, as 
appropriate, technical statutory guidance for 
England on sampling and testing for the presence 
of GMOs; and ii) amending the threshold, for 
England, below which products containing 
adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of 
GMOs do not need to be labelled.”22 Ministers are 
thus empowered to amend GMO law by secondary 
17  PPP SI reg 4(29)(e); MRL SI regs 4(9), 7(6), 7(8) and 9(2)
18  PPP SI reg 12(2); MRL SI reg 7(13)
19  PPP SI reg 12(6); MRL SI reg 9(4)
20  https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/legislation_en 
21  Exiting the European Union, Animals, Environmental Protection, 
Food, Intellectual Property, Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 SI 2019/778, 
Explanatory Memorandum para 2.4
22  Ibid para 7.7
introduced its Environment Bill on October 1513 
which proposes to create a new enforcement body 
for environmental law, the Office of Environmental 
Protection. The Bill, as it stands, does not apply to 
the food safety legislation we review.
PESTICIDE APPROVALS AND 
MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS IN FOOD 
AND FEED14
EU law regulates the use of pesticides, the 
approval of active ingredients in pesticide products 
and maximum residue levels of pesticides in 
food and feed.15 The European Commission is 
responsible for the approval of active ingredients 
and for setting maximum residue levels. This 
is subject to a scrutiny procedure involving the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which 
provides scientific risk assessments, and the 
Standing Committee for Food Chain and Animal 
Health composed of representatives from Member 
States. The EU is divided into three zones for the 
authorisation of pesticide products: one Member 
State in a zone decides whether to grant or refuse 
authorisation, other Member States decide on 
restrictions in their territory.
The UK Government’s approach is to replace 
the roles of EFSA, the Standing Committee and 
the European Commission with discretionary 
powers for UK ministers to amend, revoke or 
make pesticide regulations and issue guidance on 
how approval processes for new pesticides and 
maximum residue levels are to be carried out.16 
These SIs thus create a new legal framework 
for pesticides by consolidating powers to a 
single entity in each UK nation and removing 
requirements for oversight and scrutiny of changes 
to pesticide regulation. Provision in EU law for the 
integration of independent scientific assessments 
is replaced with discretion for ministers to decide 
whether or not to obtain independent scientific 
13  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environment-
bill-2019
14  Initial analysis of the Plant Protection Products SI was 
undertaken by Ffion Thomas and published in a previous UKTPO blog: 
C Anthony, F Thomas and E Lydgate, ‘Not just a technical exercise: 
a look at new UK pesticides regulation,’ May 2019: http://blogs.
sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2019/05/15/not-just-a-technical-exercise-a-
look-at-new-uk-pesticides-regulation
15  https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides_en
16  The Plant Protection Products (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 SI 2019/556 (PPP SI), reg 12(6); The 
Pesticides (Maximum Residue Levels) (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019 SI 2019/557 (MRL SI) regs 6(c)(2), 4(3) and 7(10)
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legislation, albeit after consultation with the 
Food Standards Agency, replacing the legislative 
functions of the Commission, the Standing 
Committee and EU reference laboratories.23
With respect to GMO authorisations, the SI 
replaces: 
• EFSA with food safety authorities in each UK 
nation; 
• the Commission and the Standing Committee 
roles for authorisations and amending non-
essential elements of the legislation with UK 
ministers; 
• the Commission’s role in administration of 
the regime with the FSA for submission of 
monitoring reports; 
• the ‘Community reference laboratory’ with a 
reference laboratory or ‘public analyst’ at the 
ministers discretion.24 
While this SI reproduces some aspects of EU law 
in respect of GMOs, the checks and balances on 
ministerial power are being weakened.
FOOD ADDITIVE AUTHORISATIONS 
AND MONITORING
The EU operates a system of authorisation of 
food additives with conditions of use based on 
safety assessments, the technological need for 
the additive, and standards on the provision of 
consumer information.25 Brexit SIs concerned with 
food additives transfer many of the provisions of 
the EU’s regime into UK law, but they make several 
key changes: they revoke EU provisions requiring 
re-evaluations, monitoring and reporting the scale 
and patterns of the consumption of additives, 
as well as substantive changes to requirements 
for certain types of additives. The Brexit SI 
dealing with amendments to the food additives 
enforcement regime revokes the EU regulation 
on re-evaluation of approved food additives.26 
The Explanatory Memorandum refers to “other 
legislative mechanisms by which new and emerging 
23  Ibid reg 7
24  The Genetically Modified Food and Feed (Amendment etc) (EU 
Exit) Regulations 2019 2019/705
25  https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food_improvement_agents/
additives/eu_rules_en
26  The Food Additives, Flavourings, Enzymes and Extraction 
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019/860, reg 170 revoking Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 257/2010 setting up a programme for the re-
evaluation of approved food additives
scientific data must be brought to the attention of 
the UK authorities by applicants” and refers to the 
statutory duty of the FSA under the Food Standards 
Act 1999 to monitor scientific evaluations from 
international assessment bodies, such as EFSA 
and the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on 
Food Additives. To assess the implications of this 
change, one would require an analysis of how the 
FSA has and will monitor the information from 
international assessment bodies and how they are 
required to integrate that information into UK law 
and policy.
This Brexit SI also omits key provisions of the EU 
regime which provide for a harmonised system 
of monitoring consumption and use of food 
additives using a risk-based approach.27  This 
change suggests that the Government intends 
to cease monitoring the consumption of food 
additives, which would be a significant change 
of policy. Further substantive changes to EU law 
have been identified. Reference to enzymes in 
wine-making practices is omitted in the Brexit SI 
without explanation,28 which effectively deregulates 
enzymes for the UK’s domestic wine-making 
industry. EU regulations on smoke flavourings in 
food are amended, omitting the stipulation that 
applications for authorisation and opinions from 
authorities should be made accessible to the 
public,29 depriving the public of information on new 
food additives in smoke flavourings. This SI also 
confers powers to UK ministers to amend retained 
EU law on food additives by secondary legislation 
in the future.30
MICRO-BIOLOGICAL FOOD SAFETY
EU legislation stipulates that only water can 
be used to wash animal carcasses, except for 
lactic acid solution that can be used on beef 
carcasses, providing the now infamous prohibition 
on ‘chlorinated chicken’. 31 If an EU Member State 
wishes to use another substance, they have to 
seek approval by the Commission which is assisted 
by a regulatory committee composed of Member 
27  Ibid reg 104 amending Regulation (EU) No 1333/2008 on food 
additives Art 27
28  Ibid reg 73
29  Ibid reg 24
30  Ibid reg 52.
31  Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal 
origin
6B R E X I T  F O O D  S A F E T Y  L E G I S L AT I O N  A N D  P OT E N T I A L  I M P L I C AT I O N S  F O R  U K  T R A D E :  T H E  D E V I L 
I N  T H E  D E TA I L S
Statutory 
Instrument
Substantive policy 
changes introduced
Authorisation of future policy 
changes and new legal 
frameworks by statutory 
instrument
Weakening of 
requirement to obtain 
independent scientific 
assessment
Weakening 
of monitoring 
mechanisms
Pesticides 
(approval 
of active 
substances)
No
Yes – UK Ministers may 
amend, revoke or make 
pesticide regulations and 
issue guidance on approval 
processes for active 
substances
Yes – Ministers may 
obtain scientific 
advice at their 
discretion
Yes – 
requirement 
for immediate 
action in 
emergency 
situations is 
removed
Pesticides 
(Maximim 
Residue 
Levels)
No (list of products 
in annexes as at 
‘immediately before 
exit day’ should be 
checked with new UK 
register)
Yes - UK Ministers may make 
new SIs setting evaluation 
principles for applications, 
default values for active 
substances, specification 
of concentration factors 
and sampling methods; UK 
ministers may amend or 
remove an entry from the MRL 
Register by SI
Yes – Ministers may 
obtain independent 
scientific advice at 
their discretion
Yes – deletion 
of emergency 
measures 
provision
GMOs 
(authorisation)
No
Yes - discretionary powers 
for ministers to amend 
application rules, authorisation 
rules and labelling rules, by 
secondary legislation
No – FSA designated 
to provide an 
opinion; though 
safety assessments 
and appointment of 
reference laboratories 
is discretionary
Yes – deletion 
of emergency 
measures 
provision
GMOs 
(labelling)
No
Yes - Ministers can change 
(not only lower) thresholds 
for labelling GMOs, amend 
the system to assign unique 
identifiers and publish 
technical guidance on 
sampling and testing
No – consultation with 
FSA required before 
amending regulations
Food additives
Yes – prohibition of 
the use of additives 
in ‘traditional foods’ 
removed; reference 
to enzymes in wine-
making removed; 
publication of 
application information 
on smoke flavourings 
omitted
Yes – Ministers may make 
regulations by statutory 
instrument to amend 
functional classes of 
food additives, labelling 
requirements for food 
colourings and the list of 
authorised substances.
No - Addition 
or removal of a 
substance from the 
list may be prescribed 
by ministers after 
seeking advice of the 
FSA
Yes – removal of 
requirement to 
monitor intakes 
of additives; 
revokes the EU 
regulation on 
re-evaluation of 
approved food 
additives
Microbiological 
food safety
Yes – easier to approve 
substances other than 
water (ie, chlorine) for 
carcass washes 
No No
Yes
Leaving RASFF 
(by default)
Table 1: Summary table - Brexit SI compared with EU legislation
7States.32 In the Brexit SI, businesses can use 
any substance authorised by the UK Food Safety 
Authority (FSA). The SI then specifies that “those 
measures, designed to amend … elements of this 
Regulation by, among other things, supplementing 
it, shall be prescribed by the appropriate authority 
[Government ministers].”33 This suggests that 
ministers are able to prescribe changes in the 
substances approved to wash animal carcasses 
without the checks and balances provided in the 
EU legislation. 
Brexit SIs also revoke UK participation in the EU-
wide Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (or 
RASFF), unless agreed with the EU.34 The RASFF 
system permits participant Member States to 
receive rapid notification of unsafe and rejected 
consignments of food and feed products.35 The 
system makes it far harder for dishonest traders 
to unload rejected consignments. The Explanatory 
Memorandum implicitly acknowledges that 
remaining in the RASFF system would be very 
beneficial36,  but if the UK leaves the EU without 
such an agreement remaining in RASFF will be 
impossible. Its loss would create an increased 
risk of unsafe foods and drinks coming into the 
UK, and EU Member States will not hear of UK 
rejections and may become less enthusiastic about 
buying UK food products. In 2018 it emerged that, 
if food supplies were running low and deliveries of 
food coming into the UK from EU Member States 
were delayed at Channel ports, the Government 
would ensure that foodstuffs would be exempted 
from Port Heath Inspections, to avoid any 
further delays.37 Abandoning those checks would 
encourage dishonest traders to funnel into the UK 
consignments that had been rejected as unsafe.
32  Article 12(2) of the legislation specifies that the substance must 
be approved in accordance with Articles 5 and 7 of Council Decision 
1999/468/EC
33  The Specific Food Hygiene (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019, SI 2019/640 part 2 reg 6. 
34  General Food Law (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 
SI 2019/614.
35  https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasff_en
36  Ibid, Explanatory Memorandum para 7.8
37  Chris Grayling on BBC Question Time, 15 March 2018: https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-43425055/chris-grayling-no-
post-brexit-lorry-checks-at-dover; George Eustace Minister of State at 
DEFRA to the House of Lords EU Energy & Environment Committee, 
28 Feb. 2018 https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/040d0036-
10ec-4dab-a693-8abb5f3f2a4d; and Lord Bridges on BBC R4 Today 
Programme on Saturday: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
b0b845dw (minutes 51-57)
TRADE IMPLICATIONS
Due to a lack of agreement on UK-wide 
policymaking, the Brexit SIs we review here confer 
powers to amend and make future laws to UK 
Government ministers for England, Welsh ministers 
for Wales, Scottish ministers for Scotland and 
designated authorities for Northern Ireland in 
the absence of a functioning executive. It is only 
where consent is given by the devolved nations, 
that the UK Government can establish a UK-wide 
regime. This could create complications for the 
UK’s internal market after Brexit. For both legal and 
political reasons, the new regulatory framework 
poses an increased risk of fragmentation, with 
potential implications for trade within the UK (aka 
intra-UK trade). The new Withdrawal Agreement, if 
passed, would mean that Northern Ireland would 
remain aligned with EU law on the areas reviewed 
in this Briefing Paper.
It is important to note that, under existing EU rules, 
the UK’s devolved administrations can already 
diverge in some cases. They maintain the ability, 
for example, to ban different pesticide formulations 
and individual GMOs for use in cultivation, even if 
they have been approved in other countries of the 
UK. However, EU rules provide a common baseline; 
whilst individual Member States (and the devolved 
UK administrations) can adopt a more restrictive 
approach, for example through banning a particular 
pesticide formulation, they cannot adopt a less 
restrictive one, by for example authorising an 
active substance that is banned at the EU level. In 
contrast, the devolved powers provided in the SIs 
do not ensure a common baseline. 
With very few exceptions, EU rules provide for 
unimpeded trade between Member States without 
regulatory controls or border checks. Thus, for 
example, even if France and/or Austria bans 
the use of glyphosate-based herbicides for crop 
cultivation,38 they are bound to accept food exports 
from other Member States if they comply with EU-
wide Maximum Residue Levels for glyphosate. 
By contrast, the Brexit SIs provide the devolved 
administrations with broader discretion not only 
to make changes to the procedures for approving 
‘active substances’ for pesticides, but also to 
amend the list of Maximum Residue Levels. Thus, 
38  https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-france-agriculture-glyphosate/
france-suggests-glyphosate-exit-could-be-even-slower-than-planned-
idUKKCN1Q41S0; E Sfiligoj, ‘Austria Votes to Ban Glyphosate’, 8 
July 2019, https://www.croplife.com/editorial/austria-votes-to-ban-
glyphosate/ 
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8it is possible that the permitted residue levels 
might differ between countries, particularly if 
approvals of active substances are not (all) UK-
wide, which may have implications for trade within 
the UK.
Similar issues arise with respect to divergence in 
other areas. This raises the question of how the 
UK can avoid introducing internal UK regulatory 
controls and border checks to ensure that products 
comply with divergent jurisdictional requirements.39 
A UK-US trade deal that covered food and 
agricultural products would exacerbate those 
tensions. The US approach to food safety differs 
notably from that of the EU, and the USA has made 
clear that aligning UK rules and standards with US 
regulations is a priority negotiating objective. Yet 
Scotland has committed to introducing legislation 
to ensure that its regulations will continue to 
align with those of the EU.40 Aside from the 
obvious political problems, if one or more devolved 
administration refuses to re-align its food safety 
regulations from those of the EU to comply US 
standards, after a US-UK Free Trade Agreement, it 
will complicate the flows of agricultural and food 
products within the UK.
Alternatively, a number of different scenarios, 
including the draft Withdrawal Agreement, include 
alignment of Northern Irish food safety regulation 
with that of the Irish Republic and the entire EU. 
The Scottish Government could argue that it too 
should also have this same alignment with the EU, 
thus further fracturing the UK’s internal market and 
potentially requiring more intra-UK border checks.
The necessity to establish UK-wide ‘common 
frameworks’ has been agreed by the current 
devolved administrations to enable the UK’s 
internal market to function after Brexit, and ensure 
39  How the proposed arrangements with Northern Ireland would be 
implemented is unclear.
40  The Welsh and Scottish Governments initially withheld 
legislative consent for the EU Withdrawal Bill due to restrictions on 
devolved powers in areas previously within the competence of the 
EU. Both legislatures introduced ‘Continuity Bills’, which the Welsh 
Government withdrew after agreement had been reached on revised 
provisions. The Bill was passed despite the ongoing dispute between 
the UK and Scottish Governments. The Scottish Government’s 
Continuity Bill was referred to the Supreme Court, which found part 
of the Bill to be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament due to its proposed modification of the Scotland Act 
1998 and the EUWA. The Scottish Government have subsequently 
abandoned the Bill and committed to introducing legislation to 
ensure Scots law continues to align with EU law; strengthening 
environmental governance, safeguarding human rights and 
implementing new protocols for the scrutiny of EU Exit legislation. 
https://news.gov.scot/news/continuity-bill-update
compliance with international obligations, but 
that consensus may break down, especially if 
the UK leaves the EU without a deal, or if English 
standards diverge from those of the EU. Internal 
fragmentation would diminish the UK Government’s 
ability to enter into new international agreements, 
including those concerning trade and security. 
The Government’s latest assessment identified 
160 areas where common frameworks may be 
required, the majority of which relate to agriculture 
and the environment, where future legislation 
may be needed.41 Potential areas for unified 
regulatory frameworks include animal health and 
traceability, animal welfare, plant health, seeds 
and propagating material, food compositional 
standards, food hygiene, food labelling, organic 
farming standards, agrichemical regulations, food 
and feed safety as well as GMO cultivation. 
The Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) is currently 
the main formal mechanism for establishing 
agreements between the UK Government and 
the devolved administrations. Recommendations 
to improve the current JMC system, from the 
Common Scottish Affairs Select Committee include 
the creation of a sub-committee on common 
frameworks and improved dispute resolution.42 
The Welsh Government has called for the creation 
of a UK Council of Ministers, served by an 
independent secretariat.43 The UK Government 
has recognised a case for some reforms as well 
as the fragility of the relationship between the 
UK and Scottish Governments; however, it has 
rejected the proposal to establish a Council of 
Ministers, instead proposing to improve meetings 
and dispute resolution.44 An action plan consisting 
of five phases for the establishment of common 
frameworks was set out in the latest framework 
analysis; however, the process has remained in 
phase 2 (detailed policy development) for 16 
months.45   
41  Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) Communique 
(16 October 2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/652285/Joint_Ministerial_Committee_communique.pdf
42  Scottish Affairs Committee, The relationship between the UK 
and Scottish Governments (House of Commons June 2019) HC 
1586
43  Welsh Government, Securing Wales’ future: Transition from the 
European Union to a new relationship with Europe (2017), p 28
44  Scottish Affairs Committee, The relationship between the UK 
and Scottish Governments: Government’s response to the Committee’s 
Eighth Report (House of Commons July 2019) HC 2532.
45  Scottish Affairs Committee, The future of Scottish agriculture 
post-Brexit (House of Commons July 2019) HC 1637 para 53
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9If Brexit happens in the near future, and especially 
if the UK leaves without a deal, the need to 
address these issues will be urgent. If the UK 
Government weakens its food safety standards 
below those of the EU, Scotland and maybe 
Wales too, will be unwilling to follow suit, and 
the resultant domestic frictions will complicate 
the UK’s attempts to conclude trade agreements 
internationally. Discussions about the role of 
devolved nations in UK trade negotiations have 
also been inconclusive. The default Concordat on 
International Relations reserves power to the UK 
Government, but provides for consultation with 
devolved nations on UK negotiating positions 
that fall within devolved competencies.46 The UK 
Government has promised an updated concordat 
on the role of devolved nations in trade policy, but 
it is still forthcoming.47
The UK Parliament has relatively little oversight 
over UK trade negotiations, as compared to the US 
or EU parliaments.48 Whilst Parliament must pass 
primary legislation, if required, to implement a new 
treaty, it does not have the power to approve, reject 
or amend treaties made by the Government; it can 
only postpone their ratification. Though the House 
of Lords Constitution Committee recently described 
this as ‘limited, anachronistic and inadequate’,49 
the UK Government has argued that reform is not 
necessary, in part because of Parliament’s powers 
to pass the legislation required to bring treaties 
into effect.50 Yet some of the SIs discussed above 
provide extensive scope for ministers to make 
future changes without parliamentary scrutiny. This 
could provide a relatively clear path for a UK Prime 
Minister to overcome parliamentary opposition to a 
new trade agreement. For example, the US has long 
complained of the lengthy EU process for approving 
new GMOs, which the US Trade Representative 
46  Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements 
between the United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Ministers, 
the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_and_the_
Devolved_Administrations.pdf
47  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/
cmscotaf/2480/248002.htm
48  https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/
Summary/SN05855
49  Select Committee on the Constitution, Parliamentary scrutiny of 
treaties (House of Lords April 2019) HL 347.
50  ‘The framework set out reflects the fact that any implementing 
legislation to modify domestic law will be subject to separate 
parliamentary scrutiny … before any treaty can enter into force.’ 
‘Process for making Free Trade Agreements after the United Kingdom 
has left the European Union’, Department for International Trade, 
February 2019, pp. 6-7
(USTR) estimates costs US agriculture $2 billion/
year.51 The SIs concerning GMOs give ministers 
powers to amend rules covering applications and 
authorisations of GMOs through future SIs.52 
The USTR also complains of the EU’s ‘hazard-
based’ approach to banning some pesticides 
categorically, rather than permitting them subject 
to limitations on conditions of use and on residue 
levels.53 Pesticide SIs give UK ministers the ability 
to amend, revoke and make regulations on how 
active ingredients in pesticides are authorised, and 
amend the maximum residue levels permitted in 
food ‘as ministers consider appropriate’, so they 
could abandon the more precautionary ‘hazard-
based’ approach in favour of a more permissive 
‘risk-based’ approach.’54
51  2019 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 
United States Trade Representative, 2019, p. 187
52  The Genetically Modified Food and Feed (Amendment etc) (EU 
Exit) Regulations 2019 2019/705
53  USTR (n 55) 190-191
54  The Plant Protection Products (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 SI 2019/556; The Pesticides (Maximum 
Residue Levels) (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 SI 
2019/557
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CONCLUSION
Our analysis suggests that Brexit SIs will allow ministers to exercise considerable powers of discretion 
when authorising ingredients in pesticide products, amending GMO authorisations and thresholds for 
labelling, authorising food additives and approving substances for animal carcass washes. Ministers 
may issue guidance impacting substantive policy content or make new rules governing food safety by 
secondary legislation. That high-level of discretion exceeds powers currently vested by the EU in officials 
in the European Commission; they would enable ministers to lower levels of protection for public and 
environmental health in the UK below those that currently prevail across the EU, without full scrutiny of 
Parliament and with weakened requirements for the integration of scientific assessment.
Most of these SIs underwent Parliamentary debate through the so-called ‘affirmative procedure’.55 Yet, 
as Baroness Smith of Basildon wrote:
In many areas [...] bringing this legislation into UK law is essential [...] But we need to ensure that the 
avalanche of documents being presented to Parliament is accurate and fulfils the commitments made to 
maintain […] safeguards. The fear is that the two are incompatible.56
Environmental organisations have also raised concerns; Peake and Chambers of Greener UK explained 
that ‘[d]espite stalwart efforts by many NGOs, we have only been able to analyse a small amount of 
legislation, while swathes have passed by without us even opening the covers.’57 In this Briefing Paper 
we aim to make a small contribution to this analysis.
The SIs enable the possibility for divergence between devolved nations in some food safety standards 
that goes beyond what was permitted in the EU framework. As well as complicating the free movement 
of goods between devolved nations, this could contribute to the fragmentation of unity between 
Scotland, which, as we document above, has committed to maintain alignment with EU regulation, and 
England, which has signalled a desire to depart from EU standards in favour of a US trade agreement.58 
Further, food safety SIs themselves provide delegated powers for the Government to circumvent the 
legislative protections provided by primary legislation, giving more scope to the Government to override 
Parliamentary opposition to changes to UK food safety legislation that implement such an agreement. 
55  See above (n 8) 
56  Baroness Smith of Basildon, ‘Avalanche of Brexit Law Could Overwhelm Parliament’, Times(£), 31 January 2019.
57  Libby Peake and Ruth Chambers, Greener UK, https://greenallianceblog.org.uk/2019/05/07/beyond-the-no-deal-panic-we-need-full-
scrutiny-of-brexit-legislation
58  https://www.politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-policy-agenda/agriculture/news/107053/brexit-uk-moves-scrap-%E2%80%98level-playing-
field%E2%80%99-eu; https://unearthed.greenpeace.org/2019/10/07/brexit-liz-truss-theresa-villiers-defra/  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
• Primary legislation should be required for reforms of legislative frameworks and major policy 
changes for food safety (and more generally).  Only primary legislation provides Parliament with 
adequate time and opportunities to scrutinise and amend proposals; those procedures also allow 
for wider consultations and public participation.
• Scrutiny procedures for Brexit Statutory Instruments should be enhanced. One way of doing this 
would be to enhance recognition of the unique status of retained EU law by providing Parliament the 
ability to amend those instruments.
• Further devolution of powers to set food safety regulations after Brexit could result in intra-UK trade 
barriers and aggravate political fragmentation. To prevent this, it’s essential that devolved nations 
have strong oversight over UK external trade negotiations, and for devolved nations to harmonise 
food standards where necessary for the internal UK market.
• Parliament should, at the very least, adopt legislation stipulating that, if the ratification of a post-
Brexit Trade Agreement requires changes to the levels of statutory protection in the areas of 
food safety, the environment and animal welfare, such changes must be made through primary 
legislation.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Emily Lydgate is a lecturer in Law at the University 
of Sussex and a fellow of the UK Trade Policy 
Observatory. She recently completed an EU Marie 
Curie Fellowship, and holds a PhD from King’s 
College London and an MSc (with distinction) from 
Oxford University. She has also consulted at the 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Economics and 
Trade Branch, and acted as programme officer for 
the Clean Trade Project.
Chloe Anthony is a ESRC-funded doctoral 
researcher at Sussex University focusing on UK 
land law and environmental governance. This 
research asks how law constrains or facilitates 
land management with environmental and social 
benefit and will include case studies of small-
scale projects such as small farms, conservation 
sites and urban growing enterprises. Chloe has 
recently requalified in environmental law having 
been a tutor for sustainable land management and 
a freelance writer and editor. She has contributed 
to the UK Environmental Law Association bulletin 
on UK air quality law and agriculture policy and 
has undertaken research on Brexit implications 
for environmental law in light of emerging EU Exit 
legislation.
Erik Millstone is an Emeritus Professor of Science 
Policy.  He has been researching the causes and 
consequences of innovation and technological 
change in the agricultural and food sectors 
since the mid-1970s.  He has also analysed the 
structures and operations of the institutions 
responsible for setting agricultural and food 
policies, including safety standards.  As a public 
intellectual, he has argued in favour of reforming 
those institutions and their policies to better 
protect public and environmental health.
ISBN 978-1-912044-86-3
© UKTPO, University of Sussex, 2019
The authors assert their moral right to be identified as the authors of this publication. Readers are encouraged 
to reproduce material from UKTPO for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. 
As copyright holder, UKTPO requests due acknowledgement. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original 
resource on the UKTPO website.
FURTHER INFORMATION
This document was writen by Emily Lydgate, Chloe 
Anthony and Erik Millstone. The authors wish to 
thank L. Alan Winters, UKTPO, and David Baldock, 
Institute for European Environmental Policy, for 
helpful comments.
The UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO), a 
partnership between the University of Sussex and 
Chatham House, is an independent expert group 
that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade 
policy proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and 
other interested parties through tailored training 
packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide 
variety of stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s 
international trading environment is reconstructed 
in a manner that benefits all in Britain and is fair 
to Britain, the EU and the world. The Observatory 
offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, 
international organisations and businesses to 
strategise and develop new trade policies in the 
post-Brexit era.
For further information on this theme or the work 
of the UK Trade Observatory, please contact:
Professor L Alan Winters 
Director 
UK Trade Policy Observatory
University of Sussex, Room 280, Jubilee Building, 
Falmer, BN1 9SL
Email: uktpo@sussex.ac.uk
Website: https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/
Twitter: @uk_tpo
B R E X I T  F O O D  S A F E T Y  L E G I S L AT I O N  A N D  P OT E N T I A L  I M P L I C AT I O N S  F O R  U K  T R A D E :  T H E  D E V I L 
I N  T H E  D E TA I L S
